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Although individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and schizophrenia (SCH) 
share overlapping characteristics and may perform similarly on many cognitive tasks, 
cognitive dysfunctions common to both disorders do not necessarily share the same 
underlying mechanisms. Decision-making is currently a major research interest for 
both ASD and SCH. The aim of the present study was to make direct comparisons 
of decision-making and disorder-specific underlying neuropsychological mechanisms 
between the two disorders. Thirty-seven participants with ASD, 46 patients with SCH, 
and 80 healthy controls (HC) were assessed with the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), which 
measures decision-making under ambiguity, and the Game of Dice Task (GDT), which 
measures decision-making under risk. The results revealed that both the ASD and SCH 
groups had deficits for both the IGT and the GDT compared with the HC. More impor-
tantly, in the IGT, participants with ASD displayed a preference for deck A, indicating that 
they had more sensitivity to the magnitude of loss than to the frequency of loss, whereas 
patients with SCH displayed a preference for deck B, indicating that they showed more 
sensitivity to the frequency of loss than to the magnitude of loss. In the GDT, the impaired 
performance might be due to the deficits in executive functions in patients with SCH, 
whereas the impaired performance might be due to the deficits in feedback processing 
in participants with ASD. These findings demonstrate that there are similar impairments 
in decision-making tasks between ASD and SCH; however, these two disorders may 
have different impairment mechanisms.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, decision-making, decision-making under ambiguity, decision-making 
under risk, game of Dice Task, iowa gambling Task, schizophrenia
Abbreviations: ANOVA, analysis of variance; AQ, Autism-Spectrum Quotient; ASD, autism spectrum disorders; DSM, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual; DST, Digit Span Test; GDT, Game of Dice Task; HC, healthy controls; IGT, Iowa Gambling 
Task; SCH, schizophrenia; TMT, Trail Making Test; WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.
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introduction
Although autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and schizophrenia 
(SCH) are classified as mutually exclusive diagnoses in the most 
recent revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) 
(APA, 2013), genetic studies have revealed that there is an overlap 
in genetic risk between the two disorders (Ionita-Laza et  al., 
2014; McCarthy et al., 2014). Similarly, many studies have indi-
cated that these two disorders share overlapping characteristics 
(Mealey et  al., 2014). Impairment in social functions is one of 
the primary features of the clinical presentations of both ASD 
and SCH (Couture et al., 2010). A range of impairments in social 
cognition have been reported in subjects with both ASD and 
SCH, including impairments in face processing (Sasson et  al., 
2007; Sachse et al., 2014), theory of mind (Chung et al., 2014), 
decision-making (Brown et al., 2015; Mussey et al., 2015), and 
empathy (Lugnegård et al., 2013).
Decision-making, one of the most frequently investigated 
social functions, refers to the process of striking a balance 
between a set of alternative options with different likelihoods of 
reward and punishment (Cheng et al., 2012). Aberrant and mala-
daptive decision-making has been described as a key concept in 
understanding several behavioral disturbances in different types 
of psychiatric and neurological disorders, including ASD and 
SCH (Brand et al., 2005; Fond et al., 2013; Mussey et al., 2015). 
As the neural and cognitive mechanisms of decision-making are 
better understood, there is a greater potential of revolutionizing 
the nosology, diagnosis, and treatment of these disorders (Lee, 
2013).
From a neuroscientific perspective, there are at least two 
types of decision-making that differ primarily in their degrees of 
uncertainty and the amount of useful information provided about 
possible consequences and their probabilities (Brand et al., 2006). 
In some situations, outcomes and probabilities are implicit, and 
the decision makers must initially find useful information and 
determine the options’ qualities by means of processing feedback 
of previous choices. This type of decision-making is often termed 
decision-making under ambiguity and is usually measured with 
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 2000). In this task, 
participants are presented with four decks and series of cards from 
which they must make choices. They are unaware of the quantity 
of cards they need to choose or which decks are disadvantageous 
(i.e., coupling large gains with even larger losses, which leads to 
a negative overall balance in the long term) or advantageous (i.e., 
coupling small gains with even smaller losses, which leads to a 
positive overall balance in the long term).
In general, decision-making seems to be influenced differently 
by various parameters, such as the magnitudes/frequencies of 
gains/losses, response costs, delays, and probabilities of gains/
losses (Drechsler et  al., 2010). An important factor that might 
contribute to performance on the IGT is individual deck level 
preferences. The role of individual deck level preferences in 
assessing IGT performance was overlooked by the majority of the 
previous studies (Buelow and Suhr, 2013, 2014). Although decks 
A and B lead to long-term negative outcomes, deck A includes 
high-frequency and low-magnitude losses while deck B includes 
low-frequency and high-magnitude losses. Greater deck A or 
greater deck B selections depend on whether the participants 
display more sensitivity to the magnitudes or frequencies of losses 
(Bechara, 2008).
In contrast to decision-making under ambiguity, explicit 
information about the potential consequences of various choices 
and their probabilities are provided in some decision situations. 
This type of decision-making is referred to as decision-making 
under risk, and it is frequently measured with the Game of Dice 
Task (GDT; Brand et  al., 2005). The GDT requires subjects to 
choose between alternative categories that are explicitly related to 
a specific amount of gain/loss. Winning probabilities are obvious 
and stable from the beginning of the task. Two out of the four 
alternative categories related to high potential gains/losses but 
low probabilities of winning are high-risk decisions; the other 
two alternative categories related to lower potential gains/losses 
but higher probabilities of winning are low-risk decisions. Thus, 
subjects are able to estimate the risk related to each alternative 
category and apply strategies to maximize their profits.
Previous studies have shown that performance on the GDT 
significantly correlates with executive functions, such as set-
shifting, categorization, and cognitive flexibility as measured 
by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST). The relationship 
between them was confirmed not only in healthy controls 
(HC) (Gathmann et  al., 2014; Schiebener et  al., 2014) but also 
in participants with various neuropsychiatric disorders (Brand 
et al., 2005; Labudda et al., 2009). In addition, several studies have 
related impaired decision-making in the GDT to poor capacities 
to advantageously utilize feedback processing (Brand, 2008; Yao 
et al., 2014). For instance, participants who use negative feedback, 
in terms of losses, to modify their strategies appear to choose the 
low-risk options more frequently than those who ignore receiving 
losses, and they are more likely to obtain a better performance on 
the GDT (Labudda et al., 2009).
There were a series of studies in which the IGT and GDT were 
used to examine decision-making performance in participants 
with ASD and patients with SCH. Four previous studies that 
used the IGT investigated decision-making under ambiguity in 
participants with ASD. Two studies found that both the patient 
group and the control participants learned to make more advanta-
geous decisions during the first half of the IGT; however, toward 
the second half of the task, the participants with ASD did not 
continue to increase their choices from advantageous options at 
the same rate as the control subjects (Johnson et al., 2006; Yechiam 
et al., 2010). Both studies suggested that the participants with ASD 
might have made more frequent shifts between decks during the 
IGT and had difficulty learning which alternatives were advanta-
geous and which were disadvantageous. Another study by Mussey 
et al. (2015) indicated that the participants with ASD displayed 
impaired performance on the IGT and slower learning with 
regard to which decks were advantageous compared to the HC. In 
contrast, South et al. (2014) observed the opposite pattern. They 
found that subjects with ASD performed better on the IGT than 
a group of control participants. Previous studies have investigated 
the performance of patients with SCH on the IGT; these yielded 
inconsistent results. On the one hand, several studies have shown 
that the performance of patients with SCH does not differ from that 
of controls (Cavallaro et al., 2003; Rodriguez-Sanchez et al., 2005). 
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On the other hand, most studies have found that SCH patients 
choose more disadvantageous options than healthy subjects (Lee 
et al., 2007; Sevy et al., 2007; Yip et al., 2009; Raffard et al., 2011; 
Cella et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2015).
To the best of our knowledge, no study so far has investigated 
decision-making under risk using the GDT in participants with 
ASD. Only two studies have examined decision-making in SCH 
patients using the GDT. One revealed that there was no significant 
difference in GDT performance between SCH patients and HC 
(Lee et al., 2007). Another study showed that patients with SCH 
demonstrated inferior performance on the GDT as compared to 
HC. It also showed that they differed from HC in that they made 
a higher number of high-risk choices (Fond et al., 2013).
A series of studies that independently examined decision-
making hinted at significant overlap between these two disorders. 
Both patient groups have demonstrated impaired performance 
on decision-making tasks compared to HC (Raffard et al., 2011; 
Brown et al., 2015; Mussey et al., 2015). However, no study to date 
has attempted to compare the decision-making performance of 
individuals with ASD to the performance of patients with SCH. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that while decision-making 
dysfunctions common to both disorders may be phenotypi-
cally similar, they do not necessarily share the same underlying 
mechanism (Mealey et  al., 2014). For instance, to identify 
disorder-specific underpinnings of emotion processing in ASD 
and paranoid SCH, Sachse et al. (2014) compared facial emotion 
recognition abilities on different levels of emotion and stimuli 
complexity. These researchers’ findings revealed distinct underly-
ing neurocognitive abilities in each patient group compared with 
HC, with poorer face identity recognition in individuals with 
ASD and reduced visual perception in patients with SCH.
Accordingly, we investigated decision-making in carefully 
diagnosed and well-characterized samples of participants with 
ASD and SCH using the IGT, the GDT, and a neuropsychological 
test battery and compared them to HC. Consistent with the stud-
ies discussed, we hypothesized that both participants with ASD 
and SCH would display poorer performance on the IGT and the 
GDT compared to a matched control group. Additionally, we fur-
ther investigated whether there were disorder-specific underlying 
cognitive mechanisms for impaired performance on the IGT and 
the GDT in these two groups.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The study sample included 37 participants with ASD, 46 patients 
with SCH, and 80 HC. The diagnostic assessments of the patients 
were initially performed by two experienced psychiatrists and 
were confirmed using the Structural Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). All of the participants gave written 
informed consent. The study was executed in accordance with 
the Declaration of Helsinki, and it was approved by the ethical 
committee at Anhui Medical University.
The participants with ASD were recruited from the outpa-
tients of the Department of Rehabilitation at the First Affiliated 
Hospital of Anhui Medical University. The participants with ASD 
had been diagnosed with Asperger’s disorder or high-functioning 
autism according to the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). According 
to the DSM-5 (APA, 2013), individuals with a well-established 
DSM-IV-TR diagnosis of autistic disorder, Asperger’s disorder, 
or pervasive developmental disorder  –  not otherwise speci-
fied – should be given the diagnosis of ASD. Thus, the participants 
were diagnosed as having ASD. The participants were excluded 
if they: (1) met any other DSM-IV-TR axis I diagnosis, (2) had 
been treated with any psychiatric medication or (3) had an IQ 
score lower than 75. Standardized diagnostic scales such as the 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 2000) and 
the Autism Diagnostic Interview  –  Revised (Lord et  al., 1994) 
have not been adapted for use in mainland China. To confirm the 
diagnosis of ASD, all of the participants completed the Chinese 
version of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001) to corroborate their clinical presentation. Participants 
with ASD scored above the cutoff point. In addition, the IQ 
scores of all of the participants were tested using the standard-
ized Raven test (Wang and Qian, 1997). The ASD group totaled 
37 subjects, which included 6 women and 31 men (mean age: 
18.9 ± 3.64 years; years of education: 8.7 ± 2.8; IQ: 103.2 ± 14.6).
The SCH patients were recruited from the Mental Health 
Center of Anhui Province and were hospitalized at the time of 
the assessment. SCH patients were included if they: (1) met the 
DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria for first-episode SCH, (2) did 
not meet any other DSM-IV-TR axis I diagnoses, and (3) had 
never been treated with any antipsychotic medications. The SCH 
group totaled 46, consisting of 9 women and 37 men (mean age: 
19.9 ± 3.76 years; years of education: 10.5 ± 1.8; IQ: 106.5 ± 16.0). 
Symptom severity was assessed with the Positive and Negative 
Syndrome Scale (PANSS) for SCH (PANSS total: 94.8  ±  9.4; 
PANSS positive: 25.6 ± 5.9; PANSS negative: 20.7 ± 4.4; PANSS 
general psychopathology: 48.5  ±  4.1). In addition, the SCH 
patients’ AQ scores were significantly below the cutoff score.
Participants without a history of psychiatric illness or a known 
family history of ASD or SCH were recruited as HC through 
advertisements and leaflets or by word of mouth among college 
students and the local community. The exclusion criteria were 
current or past diagnoses of psychiatric disorders, neurological 
illnesses, drug or alcohol abuse, gambling addictions, or seri-
ous medical illnesses. The HC group totaled 80 participants: 13 
women and 67 men (mean age: 19.2 ± 2.96 years; years of educa-
tion: 10.6 ± 1.4; IQ: 108.1 ± 14.3). The AQ scores of the HC were 
significantly below the cutoff score. There were no significant 
differences in age [F(2,160) =  1.00, p =  0.371], sex (χ2 =  0.26, 
df = 2, p = 0.880), or IQ [F(2,160) = 1.06, p = 0.348] among the 
three groups.
neuropsychological Background Tests
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task
The WCST (Heaton et  al., 1993), which measures executive 
function, organization, and set-shifting, consists of four differ-
ent types of stimulus cards. Participants are given a set of target 
cards and requested to detect sorting principles and to match 
each target card with one of the four stimulus cards. However, 
the sorting pattern changes after 10 sequential correct responses 
and participants must switch to a new sorting pattern based on 
the feedback. The total sum of error responses, the total sum of 
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perseverative responses, the total sum of perseverative errors, and 
the total sum of categories completed are calculated for analyses. 
Participants that score low in the first three variables or score high 
in the last variable have a better capacity in cognitive flexibility, 
categorization, and set-shifting.
Trail Making Test
For Trail Making Test (TMT) A, subjects were asked to connect 25 
encircled numbers as accurately and quickly as possible in ascending 
order. For TMT B, subjects were asked to connect numbers and let-
ters alternately (e.g., 1, A, 2, B, 3, C). TMT A measures mental track-
ing and motor speed, and TMT B captures selective attention and 
cognitive flexibility (Reitan, 1992). The amount of time required to 
complete each test was calculated for analyses. A shorter time needed 
for the TMT indicates better performance. We also calculated the 
time difference (TMT B − TMT A) by subtracting the time required 
to complete TMT A from the time required to complete TMT B. The 
time difference is calculated to remove the speed component from 
the test evaluation, with high difference scores indicating that par-
ticipants have problems with multiple tracking (Lezak et al., 2004).
Digit Span Test
The Digit Span Test (DST) (Wechsler, 1987) is a common meas-
ure of verbal short-term memory and verbal working memory. 
In the DST, participants are asked to repeat a sequence of different 
numbers either forward or backward. The memory span corre-
sponds to the largest serial of numbers repeated in the right order. 
Two scores were collected: the digit span forward and backward 
scores. The more participants repeat, the better verbal short-term 
memory and verbal working memory participants have.
Decision-Making Under ambiguity
The computerized version of the IGT was used to measure 
decision-making under ambiguity (Bechara et al., 2000). In this 
task, subjects are instructed to choose one card from four decks of 
cards (A, B, C, and D). After each card selection, they win or lose 
a specified amount of money. On the IGT, decks A and B yield an 
average gain of €100 per selection, and decks C and D yield an 
average gain of €50 per selection. Ten selections from decks A or 
B lead to a net loss of €250, whereas 10 selections from decks C or 
D lead to a net gain of €250. In short, A and B are disadvantageous 
decks, they include high immediate gains, but even higher losses, 
resulting in a negative outcome over the long run; decks C and 
D are advantageous, they produce small immediate gains, but 
even smaller losses, resulting in a positive outcome in the long 
term. Moreover, there are also other inequalities between the four 
decks. For instance, although decks A and B lead to long-term 
negative outcomes, selections from deck A are punished on 50% 
of trials but deck B selections are punished on 10% of trials. The 
immediate losses on deck A are also smaller than those in deck 
B. Similar differences are observed between decks C (50% losses) 
and D (10% losses), and the immediate losses in deck C are also 
smaller than those in deck D (Bechara, 2008).
Subjects are told to increase their starting capital of €2000 
by winning as much money as possible. The IGT involves 100 
card selections, but subjects are unaware that they have to select 
100 cards. To analyze task performance, we calculated the total 
net score by subtracting the number of disadvantageous choices 
from the number of advantageous choices. A positive net score 
indicates profitable decision-making performance. The 100 trials 
were divided into five equal blocks, and the net score of each 
block of 20 cards was calculated to investigate whether decision-
making changed during the task. Furthermore, the number of 
cards selected in individual decks A, B, C, and D was calculated 
to examine the individual deck level preference.
Decision-Making Under risk
To assess decision-making under risk, we used the computerized 
GDT (Brand et al., 2005). The goal of the GDT is to increase the 
starting capital of €1000 within 18 trials. Participants are asked to 
bet before each trial which number will be thrown next. This can 
be done either by betting on a single number or a combination of 
two, three, or four numbers. They win some money if the chosen 
number or one of the chosen numbers is thrown, otherwise they lose 
the same amount of money. Each alternative category is associated 
with defined gain/loss and different winning probabilities: €1000 
gain/loss with a winning probability of 1:6 for a single number 
(single choice); €500 gain/loss with a winning probability of 2:6 
for combination of two numbers (double choice); €200 gain/loss 
with a winning probability of 3:6 for combination of three numbers 
(triple choice); €100 gain/loss with a winning probability of 4:6 for 
combination of four numbers (quadruple choice). The two former 
alternative categories, which have lower winning probabilities, 
are grouped into high-risk decisions; the two latter alternative 
categories, which have higher winning probabilities, are grouped 
into low-risk decisions. For analysis, we calculated a net score (the 
number of low-risk choices − the number of high-risk choices) to 
analyze task performance. A positive net score indicates profitable 
decision-making performance. We  also calculated how often the 
four different alternative categories (single number, two, three, or 
four numbers) were chosen.
statistical analyses
SPSS 16.0 was used to perform all of the statistical analyses. All 
of the variables were tested for normal distribution with the 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test separately for the three groups. There 
were no significant deviations from the normal distribution for 
the IGT net score, the GDT net score, or the neuropsychological 
variables. Thus, parametric methods were used for these vari-
ables. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with group as the 
between-subject factor was performed to examine the IGT net 
score and GDT net score. A one-way ANOVA with block as the 
between-subject factor was performed to examine the influence 
of the decision process on the IGT net score. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA with block as the within-subject factor and group as the 
between-subject factor was performed to compare the net score 
of the five blocks across the groups. A one-way ANOVA with 
group as the between-subject factor, a one-way ANOVA with 
deck as the between-subject factor, and a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with group as the between-subject factor and deck as the 
within-subject factor were performed to examine individual deck 
level preferences between groups. A repeated-measures ANOVA 
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with deck as the between-subject factor and block as the within-
subject factor was performed to examine how the individual deck 
level preference changes over the IGT. An ANOVA with repeated 
measures with alternative category as the within-subject factor 
and group as the between-subject factor was conducted to com-
pare the difference of selection in the four alternative categories 
across the groups. Additionally, we used a Pearson correlation 
analysis to examine the correlation between the neuropsycho-
logical test scores and the decision-making scores. The threshold 
of statistical significance was set at p < 0.05.
results
neuropsychological assessment
The three groups differed in the WCST (see Table 1). According 
to the post hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the SCH group 
performed significantly worse than the ASD and HC groups in the 
total errors, perseverative errors, and categories completed (all 
ps < 0.05, all ds ≥ 0.45), and there were no significant differences 
between the ASD and HC groups (all ps > 0.05, all ds ≤ 0.20). 
Additionally, the three groups differed in the TMT (see Table 1). 
According to the post  hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, 
the ASD and HC groups performed significantly better on the 
TMT B and difference score (TMT B − TMT A) (all ps < 0.05, all 
ds ≥ 0.40), and there were no significant differences between the 
ASD and HC groups (all ps > 0.05, all ds ≤ 0.13). No differences 
were found between the three groups for the DST (all ps > 0.05), 
indicating that performance of the ASD and SCH groups on the 
DST was comparative with that of the HC group.
Decision-Making on the igT
Net Score on the IGT
There were significant differences between net score on the IGT in 
the three groups [F(2,160) = 16.62, p < 0.001]. According to the 
post hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the HC group scored 
higher than the ASD and SCH groups (all ps < 0.001, all ds ≥ 0.40), 
and there was no significant difference between the ASD and SCH 
groups (p = 1.000, d = 0.03) (Figure 1A). To compare the net 
TaBle 1 | results of the neuropsychological tasks [mean (sD)].
asD (n = 37) sch (n = 46) hc (n = 80) F p df
WcsT
Total errors 38.70 (19.80) 46.80 (16.03) 37.91 (16.50) 4.21 0.017 2,160
Perseverative response 45.78 (25.58) 50.74 (23.62) 49.72 (25.25) 0.45 0.636 2,160
Perseverative errors 21.16 (13.81) 30.89 (12.73) 24.08 (14.78) 5.58 0.005 2,160
Categories completed 5.97 (2.36) 4.61 (2.01) 5.66 (2.52) 4.20 0.017 2,160
TMT
TMT A (s) 33.39 (6.33) 34.82 (5.55) 34.90 (6.00) 0.89 0.415 2,160
TMT B (s) 66.97 (11.48) 73.15 (8.99) 69.41 (9.69) 4.17 0.017 2,160
TMT B − TMT A (s) 33.58 (11.13) 38.34 (7.98) 34.52 (9.13) 3.34 0.038 2,160
DsT
DST forward 9.16 (1.66) 9.72 (1.49) 9.42 (1.49) 1.37 0.257 2,160
DST backward 6.32 (1.58) 6.02 (1.13) 6.25 (1.35) 0.62 0.542 2,160
ASD, autism spectrum disorders; SCH, schizophrenia; HC, healthy controls; WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; TMT, Trail Making Test; DST, Digit Span Test.
FigUre 1 | Mean net score in the igT (a) and mean net score for each 
block of 20 trials (B) for participants with asD, sch, and hc. 
***p < 0.001. Mean ± SEM is shown.
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score of the five blocks across the groups, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA was performed with block as the within-subject factor 
and group as the between-subject factor. There were significant 
main effects for group [F(2,160) = 16.62, p < 0.001], and for block 
[F(4,640) = 9.34, p < 0.001], and for group by block interaction 
effects [F(2,160) = 16.31, p < 0.001]. The comparisons of perfor-
mance on the five blocks indicated that the three groups scored 
differently in block 4 [F(2,160) = 14.85, p < 0.001]. According to 
the post  hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the HC group 
scored higher than the ASD and SCH groups (all ps < 0.001, all 
ds ≥ 0.75), and there was no significant difference between the 
ASD and SCH groups (p =  1.000, d =  0.06). The three groups 
also scored differently in block 5 [F(2,160) = 19.24, p < 0.001]. 
According to the post  hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, 
the HC group scored higher than the ASD and SCH groups (all 
ps <  0.001, all ds ≥  0.78), and there was no significant differ-
ence between the ASD and SCH groups (p =  0.566, d =  0.41) 
(Figure 1B). That is, the HC group performed significantly better 
on the IGT than the ASD and SCH groups.
Individual Deck Level Preference
A repeated-measures ANOVA with group as a between-subject 
factor and deck as a within-subject factor was performed. There 
was a significant main effect for deck [F(3,480) = 26.90, p < 0.001], 
no significant main effect for group [F(2,160) = 1.00, p = 0.369], 
and an interaction effect [F(3,480) = 11.63, p < 0.001].
There were significant differences in the overall score for 
deck A between the three groups [F(2,160) = 12.82, p < 0.001]. 
According to the post  hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, 
the ASD group selected significantly more cards from deck A 
than participants in the SCH and HC groups (all ps <  0.001, 
all ds ≥ 0.37), with no significant differences between the SCH 
and HC groups (p = 0.956, d = 0.10) (Figure 2A). There were 
significant differences in the overall score for deck B between 
the three groups [F(2,160) =  24.58, p <  0.001]. According to 
the post hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the SCH group 
selected significantly more cards from deck B than participants 
in the ASD and HC groups (all ps < 0.001, all ds ≥ 0.44), with 
no significant differences between the ASD and HC groups 
(p  =  0.22, d  =  0.18) (Figure  2B). There were no significant 
differences in the overall score for deck C between the three 
groups [F(2,160) =  1.41, p =  0.247] (Figure  2C). There were 
significant differences in the overall score for deck D between 
the three groups [F(2,160) =  10.73, p <  0.001]. According to 
the post  hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the HC group 
selected significantly more cards from deck D than participants 
in the ASD and SCH groups (all ps ≤ 0.002, all ds ≥ 0.32), with 
no significant differences between the ASD and SCH groups 
(p = 1.000, d = 0.02) (Figure 2D).
We also compared the number of selections for individual 
decks A, B, C, and D in each group. In the ASD group, the 
number of cards selected differed between the four decks 
[F(3,144)  =  13.55, p  <  0.001]. According to the post  hoc 
Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the ASD group selected 
significantly more cards from deck A than from decks B, C, 
and D (all ps <  0.01, all ds ≥  0.27) (Figure  3A). In the SCH 
group, the number of cards selected differed between the four 
decks [F(3,180) = 29.96, p < 0.001]. According to the post hoc 
Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the SCH group selected 
significantly more cards from deck B than from decks A, C, 
and D (all ps <  0.001, all ds ≥  0.47) (Figure  3B). In the HC 
group, the number of cards selected differed between the four 
decks [F(3,316) = 28.36, p < 0.001]. According to the post hoc 
Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the HC group selected 
significantly more cards from deck D than from decks A, B, and 
C (all ps < 0.001, all ds ≥ 0.43) (Figure 3C).
To examine how the individual deck level preference changes 
over the 100 trials, a repeated-measures ANOVA with deck as a 
between-subject factor and block as a within-subject factor was 
performed separately for each group. For the ASD group,  there 
was a significant main effect for deck [F(3,144)  =  12.80, 
p < 0.001], no significant main effect for block [F(4,576) = 0.00, 
p = 1.000], and an interaction effect [F(4,576) = 1.94, p = 0.028]. 
For the SCH group, there was a significant main effect for deck 
[F(3,180)  =  29.96, p  <  0.001], no significant main effect for 
block [F(4,720)  =  0.00, p  =  1.000], and an interaction effect 
[F(4,720) =  2.40, p =  0.005]. For the HC group, there was a 
significant main effect for deck [F(3,316) = 28.36, p < 0.001], no 
significant main effect for block [F(4,1264) = 0.003, p = 1.000], 
and an interaction effect [F(4,1264) = 9.23, p < 0.001].
In order to better understand the interactions, additional 
ANOVAs were computed to investigate which decks dif-
fered across the blocks. In the ASD group, the number of 
cards selected in deck A changed significantly over the five 
blocks [F(4,180) =  2.71, p =  0.032]. According to the post hoc 
Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the number of deck A in 
block 1 was significantly more than that of block 5 (p = 0.037, 
d = 0.75). However, the number of cards selected did not change 
significantly in decks B, C, and D (all ps > 0.05) (Figure 4A). In 
the SCH group, the number of cards selected in deck B changed 
significantly over the five blocks [F(4,225) =  4.39, p =  0.002]. 
According to the post  hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, 
the number of deck B in block 1 was significantly more than that 
of block 3 (p = 0.014, d = 0.58). However, the number of cards 
selected did not change significantly in decks A, C, and D (all 
ps > 0.05) (Figure 4B). In the HC group, the number of cards 
selected changed significantly over the five blocks in decks A, B, 
C, and D (all ps < 0.01) (Figure 4C). According to the post hoc 
Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the number of deck A in 
block 1 was significantly more than that of blocks 3, 4, and 5 
(all ps ≤ 0.005, all ds ≥ 0.56), and the number of deck A in block 
2 was significantly more than that of block 5 (p = 0.003, d = 0.54). 
The number of deck B in block 1 was significantly more than 
that of blocks 2, 3, 4, and 5 (all ps ≤ 0.024, all ds ≥ 0.43), and the 
number of deck B in block 2 was significantly more than that of 
block 5 (p = 0.027, d = 0.42). The number of deck C in block 1 
was significantly less than that of blocks 3, 4, and 5 (all ps ≤ 0.001, 
all ds ≥ 0.68), and the number of deck D in blocks 1 and 2 was 
significantly less than that of block 5 (all ps ≤ 0.007, all ds ≥ 0.46).
Decision-Making on the gDT
Net Score of the GDT
There were significant differences between the GDT net score 
of the three groups [F(2,160) = 6.29, p = 0.002]. According to 
FigUre 2 | Mean number of cards selected for participants with asD, sch, and hc from individual decks a (a), B (B), c (c), and D (D) during the 
igT. **p < 0.01 and ***p < 0.001. Mean ± SEM is shown.
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the post  hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the HC group 
scored higher than the ASD and SCH groups (all ps ≤ 0.014, all 
ds ≥  0.24), and there were no significant differences between 
the ASD and SCH groups (p = 1.000, d = 0.03) (Figure 5A). An 
ANOVA with repeated measures with alternative category as the 
within-subject factor and group as the between-subject factor was 
conducted. There was a main effect for choice [F(3,480) = 22.32, 
p < 0.001], and a significant interaction effect between alternative 
category and group [F(2,160) =  5.82, p <  0.001], but no main 
effect for group [F(2,160) = 0.00, p = 1.000].
The three groups significantly differed in the single choice 
[F(2,160) = 8.49, p < 0.001]. According to the post hoc Bonferroni-
corrected comparisons, the SCH group chose more in the single 
choice than the ASD and HC groups (all ps ≤ 0.023, all ds ≥ 0.25), 
and there was no significant difference between the ASD and HC 
groups (p = 1.000, d = 0.09). The three groups significantly dif-
fered in the double choice [F(2,160) = 5.95, p = 0.003]. According 
to the post hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the ASD group 
chose more in the double choice than the SCH and HC groups 
(all ps ≤ 0.014, all ds ≥ 0.31), and there was no significant dif-
ference between the SCH and HC groups (p = 1.000, d = 0.01). 
The three groups significantly differed in the quadruple choice 
[F(2,160) = 6.82, p = 0.001]. According to the post hoc Bonferroni-
corrected comparisons, the HC group chose more in the quadru-
ple choice than the ASD (p = 0.001, d = 0.35), and there were no 
significant differences between the HC and SCH groups as well as 
FigUre 3 | Mean number of deck selections for individual decks a, B, 
c, and D in the participants with asD (a), sch (B), and hc (c) during 
the igT. *p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.001. Mean ± SEM is shown.
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no significant differences between the ASD and SCH groups (all 
ps ≥ 0.154, all ds ≤ 0.17). There were no significant differences 
between the three groups in the triple choice [F(2,160) =  1.87, 
p =  0.158] (Figure  5B). In a word, the HC group performed 
significantly better on the GDT than the ASD and SCH groups.
analyses about the Use of Feedback
We examined the use of negative feedback (losses) after the deci-
sion of a high-risk option to choose a low-risk option in the next 
trial; only those participants who chose a high-risk option and 
received negative feedback at least once during the GDT were 
included. Thus, the data of 150 subjects (ASD: n =  33; SCH: 
n =  41; HC: n =  76) were analyzed. The three groups differed 
on the use of negative feedback (%) [ASD: 36.16 ± 27.71; SCH: 
52.02 ± 29.32; HC: 54.54 ± 36.26; F(2,147) = 3.75, p = 0.026]. 
According to the post  hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, 
the use of negative feedback in the ASD group was lower than in 
the SCH and HC groups (all ps < 0.05, all ds ≥ 0.27), and there 
were no significant differences between the SCH and HC groups 
(p = 1.000, d = 0.04).
We also examined the use of positive feedback (gains) after the 
decision of a low-risk option to choose a low-risk option again; 
only those participants who chose a low-risk option and received 
positive feedback at least once during the GDT were included. 
Thus, the analysis was based on the data of 155 participants 
(ASD: n = 35; SCH: n = 44; HC: n = 76). There were significant 
differences between the three groups with regard to the use of 
positive feedback (%) [ASD: 38.06 ± 25.85; SCH: 56.06 ± 27.15; 
HC: 53.00 ± 29.66; F(2,152) = 4.58, p = 0.012]. According to the 
post hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, the use of positive 
feedback in the ASD group was lower than in the SCH and HC 
groups (all ps < 0.05, all ds ≥ 0.30), and there were no significant 
differences between the SCH and HC groups (p = 1.000, d = 0.05).
correlational analyses
Correlational analyses between the GDT performance and the 
neuropsychological measurements were examined. The use of 
negative feedback was significantly associated with the net score 
on the GDT in all three groups (ASD: r = 0.47, p = 0.006; SCH: 
r = 0.57, p < 0.001; HC: r = 0.25, p = 0.029). The use of positive 
feedback was also significantly associated with net score on the 
GDT in all three groups (ASD: r = 0.51, p = 0.002; SCH: r = 0.34, 
p = 0.023; HC: r = 0.37, p = 0.001). This means that the use of 
negative feedback and the use of positive feedback are associated 
with superior GDT performance.
The relationship between the net score on the GDT and 
performance on the WCST was examined. Perseverative errors 
were significantly associated with the net score on the GDT in 
all three groups (ASD: r = −0.39, p =  0.019; SCH: r = −0.33, 
p =  0.027; HC: r = −0.38, p <  0.001). There was a significant 
positive association between the categories completed and the net 
score on the GDT in all three groups (ASD: r = 0.36, p = 0.030; 
SCH: r = 0.46, p = 0.001; HC: r = 0.43, p < 0.001). This means that 
inferior performance on the WCST (high number of persevera-
tive errors or low number of categories completed) is associated 
with inferior performance on the GDT.
FigUre 5 | Mean net score in the gDT (a) and mean number of 
choices in each single alternative (B) for subjects with asD, sch, and 
hc. **p < 0.01 and ***p < 0.001. Mean ± SEM is shown.
FigUre 4 | Mean number of cards selected from individual decks a, 
B, c, and D for participants with asD (a), sch (B), and hc (c) during 
each block. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001. Mean ± SEM is 
shown.
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The relationship between the net score on the GDT and perfor-
mance on the TMT was examined. The TMT B was significantly 
associated with the net score on the GDT in all three groups 
(ASD: r = −0.48, p =  0.003; SCH: r = −0.31, p =  0.035; HC: 
r = −0.30, p = 0.006). There was a significant negative association 
between the difference score (TMT B − TMT A) and the net score 
on the GDT in all three groups (ASD: r = −0.52, p = 0.001; SCH: 
r = −0.43, p = 0.003; HC: r = −0.32, p = 0.004). This means that 
superior performance on the TMT [shorter time needed for TMT 
B or lower difference score (TMT B − TMT A)] is associated with 
superior performance on the GDT.
In general, performance on the GDT appears to be associated 
with executive functions and feedback processing in all three 
groups.
Discussion
Two primary findings emerged from the present study. First, this 
study indicated that participants with ASD and SCH had impair-
ments in both decision-making under ambiguity, as measured 
with the IGT, and decision-making under risk, as measured 
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with the GDT. Second, the participants with ASD displayed a 
preference for deck A on the IGT, indicating that they showed 
more sensitivity to the magnitude of loss than to the frequency 
of loss, whereas the SCH patients displayed a preference for deck 
B, indicating that they showed more sensitivity to the frequency 
of loss than to the magnitude of loss. On the GDT, the impaired 
performance might be due to the deficits in executive functions 
in patients with SCH, whereas the impaired performance might 
be due to the deficits in feedback processing in participants with 
ASD.
In the present study, the subjects with ASD chose more dis-
advantageous decks than advantageous decks in the IGT. These 
findings were consistent with the study by Mussey et al. (2015), 
who found that the participants with ASD made worse deci-
sions and showed slower learning with respect to which decks 
were advantageous compared with the HC. However, few stud-
ies until now have examined decision-making with a focus on 
reward/loss magnitudes or reward/loss frequencies (Damiano 
et al., 2012). The present study also found that participants with 
ASD had a preference for deck A, which had low-magnitude 
and high-frequency losses. These findings suggested that dur-
ing the IGT, participants with ASD might be sensitive to the 
magnitude of loss but blind to the frequency of loss. It could be 
said that the occasional large loss associated with deck B was 
sufficient for the ASD group to attenuate their level of prefer-
ence for this deck as compared to the patients with SCH who 
chose from deck B more often (South et al., 2014), that is, the 
ASD group showed more sensitivity to the magnitude than to 
the frequency of loss.
Similarly, consistent with the majority of the studies in the lit-
erature (Lee et al., 2007; Yip et al., 2009; Raffard et al., 2011; Fond 
et al., 2013; Brown et al., 2015), the performance on the IGT in the 
SCH patients was impaired compared to the performance of the 
healthy participants. Furthermore, our study found that patients 
with SCH displayed a stronger preference for selecting from 
deck B. These findings were consistent with previous studies that 
found that patients with SCH selected from the disadvantageous 
deck B significantly more frequently than they selected from 
deck A (Ritter et al., 2004; Shurman et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2007; 
Brown et al., 2015). A study using the expectancy-valence model 
also indicated that patients with SCH paid significantly greater 
attention to the smaller but more frequent losses in deck A and 
showed greater insensitivity to the intermittent large losses that 
occurred with deck B (Cella et al., 2012). That is, SCH patients 
showed more sensitivity to the frequency than to the magnitude 
of loss (Kim et al., 2009). In patients with SCH, the observation 
of a preference for the deck with rare large losses (deck B) appears 
to reflect a tendency to utilize outcome–frequency information at 
the expense of outcome–magnitude information. In other words, 
performance impairments on the IGT in SCH patients are more 
likely the result of a deficit in integrating frequencies and magni-
tudes of gains and losses (Brown et al., 2015).
The role of individual deck level preferences in assessing 
IGT performance was overlooked by most previous studies 
(Buelow and Suhr, 2013). Although decks A and B lead to long-
term negative outcomes, deck A includes high-frequency and 
low-magnitude losses and deck B includes low-frequency and 
high-magnitude losses. Greater deck A or greater deck B selec-
tions depend on whether the subjects focus on the frequency or 
the magnitude of the loss (Bechara, 2008). Our findings provide 
some interesting implications for impairments in the IGT and 
emphasize the importance of examining selections from indi-
vidual decks separately, as there were differences in the numbers 
of deck A and deck B selections between the participants with 
ASD and SCH in the current study. Therefore, combining decks 
A and B into a disadvantageous deck may mask individual deck 
level preference (Buelow and Suhr, 2013).
Through analysis of the GDT score, it was found that partici-
pants with ASD displayed impaired performance on the GDT. To 
the best of our knowledge, this study was the first to use the GDT 
to examine decision-making under risk in participants with ASD. 
One important and new finding in the current study is that GDT 
performance among participants with ASD was significantly 
related to impaired performance on negative and positive feed-
back. In other words, performance on the GDT was significantly 
associated with feedback processing in participants with ASD, 
as was previously observed in healthy individuals (Brand, 2008; 
Yao et al., 2014) and other clinical populations (Labudda et al., 
2009, 2010). Feedback processing on the GDT refers to using a 
loss (negative feedback) after a high-risk decision to choose a 
safe option and using a gain (positive feedback) after a low-risk 
decision to choose a safe option again. However, in our study, 
the feedback analysis indicated that the abilities of participants 
with ASD to use negative feedback after a high-risk decision and 
positive feedback after a low-risk decision were strongly reduced. 
Therefore, we suggested that the impaired performance on the 
GDT might be due to the deficits in feedback processing in 
participants with ASD.
The SCH patients also differed from the HC in their higher 
number of choices of high-risk options. Our findings were con-
sistent with those of Fond et al. (2013), who found that individu-
als with SCH have globally impaired decision-making capacities. 
Moreover, our study showed that the GDT performance in SCH 
patients was significantly correlated with executive functions 
as measured by the WCST and TMT, as was previously found 
in other patient groups (Euteneuer et al., 2009; Labudda et al., 
2009). More significantly, our results showed that patients with 
SCH demonstrated inferior executive functions as compared to 
participants with ASD and HC. Therefore, we inferred that the 
impaired performance on the GDT might be due to the deficits 
in executive functions in patients with SCH.
Brand et al. (2006) proposed that there may be two interacting 
routes that can be used to guide decision-making under risk as 
measured with the GDT: a cognitive route, in which information 
about consequences and probabilities is integrated and utilized 
before a decision is made, and an emotional route, in which feed-
back in terms of gains and losses is processed. In line with the 
proposed cognitive route, the impaired performance on the GDT 
might be due to the deficits in executive functions in patients with 
SCH, and in agreement with the proposed emotional route, the 
impaired performance on the GDT might be due to the deficits 
in feedback processing in participants with ASD.
With respect to the DST, our study found that the ASD 
group demonstrated normal DST performance compared with 
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the HC group. This finding was in accordance with previous 
studies on the DST (Nakahachi et  al., 2006; Cui et  al., 2010). 
The normal digit span would indicate normal ability of verbal 
working memory in the participants with ASD. However, some 
studies showed that ASD were impaired in visual spatial working 
memory (Goldberg et al., 2005; Luna et al., 2007). These results 
might reveal imbalance of working memory development in 
individuals with ASD. In our study, performance of the SCH 
group on the DST was comparative with that of the HC group. 
This result is inconsistent with some studies that found reduced 
DST performance in SCH patients (Sánchez-Morla et al., 2009; 
Brébion et  al., 2014). Patients in most of the previous studies 
were receiving antipsychotic medications at the time of testing. 
However, patients with SCH in the present study had never 
been treated with any antipsychotic medications. Moreover, 
most of the patients with SCH in these studies were older adults 
(Brébion et  al., 2014), while SCH patients in our study were 
adolescents and young adults. These two points may help explain 
the discrepancy.
Our findings of overlapping features of impairments in 
decision-making suggest that ASD and SCH might share a neural 
basis, particularly in systems related to mechanisms of social 
functions. However, exploring the salient differences in cognitive 
mechanisms of deficits in decision-making between these two 
disorders is more reasonable and significant. Although com-
parative designs have several defects, they offer an effective and 
simple method for discovering shared and divergent mechanisms 
underlying pathways to social or cognitive dysfunction (Sasson 
et  al., 2011) and providing new insights and perspectives into 
disorder-specific prevention and treatment methods (Hommer 
and Swedo, 2015).
conclusion
In summary, our study revealed that individuals with ASD and 
SCH displayed impairments both in decision-making under 
ambiguity and in decision-making under risk. However, these 
impairments might involve different cognitive mechanisms in 
the two disorders. Our findings may possibly support the notion 
that different mechanisms underlie similar social dysfunctions in 
ASD and SCH. Additional studies utilizing both neuroimaging 
and genetic techniques are warranted to explore the common and 
differing neurobiological processes involved in decision-making 
in participants with ASD and SCH.
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